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Abstract: 
A critical element of successful intelligence-led law enforcement operations is the ability of 
the police and other security services to obtain timely, reliable and actionable intelligence 
concerning the problem, incident or investigation under focus. As well as traditional 
investigative techniques and information sources, open-source intelligence (OSINT) can 
provide additional capabilities for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to manage an 
investigation or address the intelligence requirements of a given incident. This position paper 
introduces the concept of OSINT, identifies and discusses existing effective practices 
and critical success factors for the fusion of OSINT with traditional intelligence sources. This 
paper is written as a position piece based upon CENTRIC operational involvement in 14 UK 
based LEA open source investigations over the years 2015 to 2017. 
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Introduction 
The private sector has, over recent years, increasingly begun to use information from open 
online source, including social media, to measure customer loyalty, track public opinion and 
assess product perception (Neri et al., 2012). Coinciding with this trend, Law Enforcement 
Agencies (LEAs) are applying techniques to enhance their investigative capability towards 
improving their response to against criminal threats (Gibson 2004; Bell & Congram, 
2012).  As a result, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) tools and techniques are increasingly 
used to be a part of law enforcement’s investigative repertoire in the identification of 
criminals and their activities; including activities targeting recruitment, transfer of money, 
information and the coordination of illicit activity (Omand et al., 2012).  
 
This paper examines the criteria used by law enforcement to utilise, deploy and maintain 
effective OSINT investigative tools and tactics, based on experiences gleaned from 
collaboration, cooperation, training and bespoke investigative work undertaken alongside 
regional UK police forces. Moreover, the paper highlights critical areas of consideration for 
modern OSINT practitioners. However, defining the specific characteristics of OSINT is not 
a straightforward task, the context and definition for the use of OSINT often changes 
dependent on the country and organisation of origin. The ambiguity of the term is explored in 
detail later in the ‘Current Challenges and Dilemmas’ section. Despite this contextual 
ambiguity, for the purposes of this paper a working definition of OSINT is used, following 
the three following defining principles; 1) OSINT consists of data collected from 'publicly 
available sources', 2) it is data to be used in an 'intelligence context', and 3) the data 
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collection can be performed in an overt manner. Furthermore, from an ontological 
perspective the paper considers OSINT to be part of a LEAs situational awareness 
capabilities.  Situational awareness, in the context of our discussion is defined as; 'the 
capability to identify, contextualise, visualise, process, and, comprehend the critical elements 
of intelligence about particular areas of concern. These areas of concern may be anything 
from an investigation to the management of a major crisis. 
The authors acknowledge - and later explore in detail - the strengths and limitations of these 
terms and how they also allow for flexibility through their interpretation. These three defining 
statements are rough outlines rather than literal definitions and are explored in the section “7. 
Emerging Challenges to OSINT Interpretation. Indeed, it is worth noting that RIPA 
(Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000) may be interpreted to have been written for 
the capacity for flexible and dynamic interpretations, and not to be an inconvenience or 
destructive restriction upon law enforcement. 
Importance of Social Media 
OSINT is increasingly focused on internet based and social media analysis (SOCMINT). To 
this extent the UK NPCC (National Police Chiefs Commission) have debated over whether to 
continue calling it OSINT, or internet investigations (NPCC National Open Source 
Intelligence and Investigations Conference, 2017). Whilst this may seem like a trivial point, it 
shows the prevalence and dominance of online and social media aspects of contemporary 
OSINT investigations over traditional 'offline' approaches. Currently, it appears that the use 
of internet based OSINT, especially regarding big data analytics are primarily used for 
intelligence gathering and investigations, and not for general community-policing. As of 
2015, it was noted that in general, the majority of police forces and OSINT practitioners 
used; "social media… to inform strategies such as pre-emptive arrests, interceptions of 
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activities, approaching particular individuals and groups, or change of tactics during events… 
(the lack of identifying community needs) is not yet part of police practice and raises 
concerns within police about the level of overlap between intelligence and engagement" 
(Carey, 2015).  As with many aspects of law enforcement and other relevant security 
practitioners, levels of engagement towards social media largely differ between forces, with 
most mainly using it to engage with community regarding ad-hoc notifications, such as public 
information announcements, and petty crime announcements. This in itself may concerns 
members of the public whom may feel that OSINT monitoring may be a 'two-way mirror'
2
, 
with intelligence practitioners able to observe and investigate, with minimum community 
engagement and interaction. 
 
It is essential to understand and respect that many elements of OSINT investigations benefit 
from refraining full disclosure policies towards the specific tactics and solutions used. It 
should be made increasingly clear to the public, the tight rules and regulations that warrant 
and authorise deployment, as well as that public security and safety may benefit from the 
indiscretion and minimized disclosure of engagement which may help to track down 
community threats, protect vulnerabilities and to maximise order. It may also be beneficial to 
reassure public opinions that the police and other OSINT certified practitioners have to 
adhere to far stricter standards, than the majority of private corporations and enterprises that 
utilise big data analytics and collect, store and correlate personal data. To the computer-
literate generations, the loss of control and ownership over personal data to organisations and 
corporations is not a revolutionary, or particularly terrifying revelation, however it may prove 
beneficial to reassure the collective, that OSINT has to adhere to far stricter protocols than 
agencies such as; Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon.   
                                                 
2
 A two way mirror has connotations of surveillance, spying and monitoring without their knowledge:  
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/two-way-mirror. 
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LEA Requirements in the Age of Austerity 
Contemporary use of internet-based OSINT has helped increase the capacity and efficiency 
of police forces, this holds a direct knock-on effect for situational awareness capabilities. One 
of the leading benefits of OSINT is through the reallocation and reduction upon traditional 
resources.  OSINT allows for relatively low-resource operations, these have the potential to 
save great amounts of physical and financial cost compared to traditional policing as they 
may carried out remotely, securely with surveillance and investigative practices often 
requiring far less manpower than the physical presence of officers ‘on the scene’. 
 
Additionally, OSINT training is seen to require relatively low cost and time investments 
when compared to other police force specialisations. The majority of UK based OSINT 
courses offer on average 2-7 day training packages, whereas undercover officer, firearms, 
covert surveillance, traffic, financial and corruption officer training courses often require 
intensive engagement courses of up to 18 months or longer (Nottinghamshire Police, 2008). 
Indeed, as of 2014, open source e-learning modules are available from the College of 
Policing consisting of condensed 35 minute long assignments (College of Policing, 2014) and 
requires little training for investigators compared to other policing specializations. 
Furthermore, if procedure, regulation and legislation are properly adhered to, OSINT 
operations are usually low risk due to the non-physical involvement, with mainly reputational 
and organisational damages on the line. Indeed, whilst reputational and organisational 
concerns surrounding online privacy and free speech are increasing, leading to increased 
force scrutiny from both public, judicial and NGO agencies, OSINT situational awareness 
also is increasingly utilised, perhaps paradoxically (Barnes, 2006), for public relations 
monitoring and post-event feedback as a necessary tool in improving community policing 
approaches.   
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Noticeably as IoT (Internet of Things) devices increasingly permeate all aspects of modern 
civilisation, all investigations now have a cyber element, this is especially true of 
considerations for police contamination of crime scenes through device connections to 
routers, local WiFi’s, etc. potentially compromising evidential material. This concern also 
encompasses the branches of OSINT situational awareness, one example being officers 
trained in basic social media search queries alongside traditional note-taking to assist in 
community roles such as identification of alleged perpetrators. Furthermore, OSINT can be 
used to parallel intelligence, this capability allows LEAs to protect undercover and embedded 
agents as well as evidence and intelligence derived from. Closed sources may be passed onto 
OSINT teams to recreate the same information and leads from publicly available information. 
 
Overall, OSINT is one of the few areas wherein LEAs and other security practitioners may 
'bring the outside in', allowing for (vetted) external expertise and advice. Indeed, 
conveniently the motto of the UK Army's SGMI (Specialist Group Military Intelligence, 
whom routinely utilise open source analysis, is; 'bringing the outside in'. Due to the nature of 
the open source material OSINT situational awareness may be expanded in more convenient 
manners to the protocols surrounding covert and classified data. For example, the outsourcing 
of security work to researchers and analysts may allow for tasking's that anonymise or 
mitigate data and intelligence concerns, instead focusing on specific lines of enquiry. For 
example, when investigating a particular individual, social media pictures may be doctored to 
hide the subject of enquiry but keep in the background imagery, allowing for external actors 
to seek intelligence on the desired location without compromising the information of the 
individual. 
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Core Requirements for Situational 
Awareness 
The ability to covertly monitor individuals, suspected of involvement in serious criminal or 
terrorist activity, has obvious benefits for the LEA and the wider security community. OSINT 
techniques can be used effectively in response to a range of law enforcement issues, from 
enhancing community safety, tackling anti-social behaviour, through to fighting serious and 
organised crime and combating terrorism. Any covert technique, including undercover or 
publically undisclosed OSINT surveillance and monitoring must be used sparingly, 
appropriately and where OSINT is deployed, that it is transparent, auditable and in 
accordance with relevant legislation. CENTRIC OSINT involvement has observed seven 
priority requirements for emerging situational awareness trends: 
1. Counter Terrorism focus of Situational Awareness 
As notoriously publicised by the technical and disseminatory skill of the Islamic State in its 
prime operating years of 2014-2016 (Winter, 2017. p.6.), online open sources play a crucial 
role in the radicalisation, recruitment, training, financing and incitement of terrorist 
objectives. Counter terror (CT) situational awareness priority requirements have been 
observed to revolve around three key vectors: 
A)    Defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability to attack of populations, territories, 
infrastructure, and communication systems of interest. 
B)     Offensive measures to locate, prevent, deter and interdict terrorist activities. 
C)     Measures to limit the consequences of terrorist attacks and to stabilise the situation in 
the aftermath of such attacks, in support of civilian authorities. 
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Regarding defensive measures, OSINT situational awareness can greatly assist through 
measures such as counterintelligence and red-teaming wherein potential target locations and 
individuals may be examined by researchers to reveal potential data leakage and information 
freely available that may compromise their security.  Offensive situational awareness OSINT 
measures may predominantly consist of traditional researcher and analyst investigative roles, 
locating, monitoring and reporting on terrorist sources. Limiting the consequences of terrorist 
actions are reactive measures including suitable public announcements, open source 
monitoring from a command and control perspective and may also include the crowdsourcing 
of intelligence for example when the FBI requested public help unmasking the Boston 
bombers of 2013 (Bruinius, 2014). 
2. Cyber Focus 
Cybercrime, cyberwarfare and cyberterrorism have each evolved rapidly and dynamically 
over the past decade. Although the perception of OSINT may traditionally be considered to 
be of lower technological finesse than conventional cyberattacks, threats and vulnerabilities, 
it however has proven to be a valuable tool in identifying emerging cyber trends and 
promoting greater resilience. One such important area is in the investigation of - and 
subsequent automated crawling of - forums and dark web markets promoting, encouraging, 
and selling guides on hacking as well as data and hardware exploitations. Increasingly, there 
is the demand for LEAs to utilise automated monitoring systems to alert OSINT investigators 
and analysts to indicators of such behaviours. This may include cross validation of news and 
public sources reporting discovered data breaches, personal info dumps with cross references 
to increased activity or keyword appearances on illicit sites such as identified darkweb 
forums.  
3. Threat Financing 
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A key challenge facing LEAs and the wider security community is in identifying and 
obstructing the funding of hostile actors. Players participating in terrorism activities are likely 
to parallel organised crime groups (OCGs) financing tactics which are already proven and 
known to avoid the scrutiny of the financial and government watch teams. However, despite 
seeking the same objectives from a financial perspective the two groups may be argued to 
hold different end objectives: OCGs seek to gain as much profit as possible operating in a 
stable environment. Usually with a consumer reliant on their activities. It is usual for OCGs 
in close proximity to operate in some agreed harmony in the best interests of each OCG. On 
the other hand, terrorist organisations usually harbour a radical and political agenda that 
requires funding for organisational and operational capacity; as such they are less likely to be 
limited by considerations to conflict with any partner. 
 
One of the leading and more complex challenges for situational awareness focused OSINT 
lies in identifying and classifying requirements for the relationship between criminal and 
terrorist funding, as well as being able to pinpoint when criminal activities may become 
terrorist financing and escalating to the suitable countermeasures and procedures. 
Subsequently, the priority approach for OSINT situational awareness of threat financing is: 
 
1.      Establish the identity of funding streams to terrorists 
2.      Identify the bad actors within an OCG who is funding terrorism 
3.      Identify apparently legitimate financial streams that subsequently leads to terrorism. 
 
4. Analysis of Cryptocurrencies 
One increasingly difficult element of threat financing is attached to blockchain 
cryptocurrencies. Whilst currencies such as bitcoin and Ethereum are publicly available and 
hold open ledgers, the tracing and monitoring of illicit exchanges requires highly specialised 
and trained individuals, often operating in the cybersecurity and espionage spheres. 
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The use of “spinners” or “tumblers” can make it frustratingly difficult for LEAs to track and 
trace online blockchain transactions (Darknetmarkets, 2017). Whilst it is appropriate to 
ensure that this funding method is not overlooked by OSINT and situational awareness 
focused departments, the actual proven cases appear limited; additionally, they appear to rely 
on a lengthy and complex period of comparing online marketplace details against individual 
blockchain transactions. 
5. Weak Indicator Analysis 
Weak indicators can be particularly useful in dealing with situations such as human 
trafficking, illegal migration, arms and explosives manufacture, and in relation to terrorist 
funding. Weak indicator crawling analyses the 'ingredients' of potential threats or areas of 
interest, for example weak indicators, or ingredients, may be rise in hawala networks, 
increased ivory trade or sim card customs seizures, relating to generating money for terrorist 
groups. Each individual ingredient isn't a useful indicator of the overall potential funding, 
however when clustered together, these automated captured ingredients may reveal areas of 
interest that indicate a wider problem.  
 
When utilising big data solutions and weak indicator analysis, it may be encouraged to split 
OSINT situational awareness teams between human led investigators and analysts and data 
scientists and researchers dealing with the interpretation of quantitative data. CENTRIC 
operations allow for the close proximity of the teams to mutually reinforce the direction of 
the investigation. One example of harmonious working is through the analysis of alleged 
terrorist recruitment social media profiles - these profiles may consist of thousands of 
separate individual connections. The human led operation may focus upon individuals whose 
profile pictures appear to support terrorist badges, emblems or carry firearms during time 
restrictions, however the data interpreter may assist leading the investigation towards other 
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profiles, for example female accounts (Dearden, 2017) whom whilst not suspicious looking, 
are priority accounts mapped out in relation to their connection and prevalence throughout 
the suspect networks. Here, successful OSINT situational awareness utilises the ‘human in 
the loop’ alongside the cognitive objectivity of big data and weak signal analysis.  Indeed, 
‘the major difference between basic and excellent OSINT “operations” lies in the analytical 
process’ (Hribar, et al. 2014), fusing both human led knowledge with machine based 
capabilities. 
6. Data Capture 
When conducting research, operators should be encouraged to keep all tabs open, this allows 
a recollection of how the user got from A to Z and assist them in explaining any links if 
required by a senior officer. Additionally, the use of secure logbook tools such as OSIRT 
(OSIRT, 2017) are actively encouraged for managing histories, logging details, data capture 
and encrypted storage as well as for hashing documents with time stamps. Overall, the 
tasking document for a specific investigation or operation is the single most important article 
in the process. All providers should make every and all efforts to ensure all information is 
provided, including historic emails, mobile numbers, landlines, associates etc. Custodial 
records often hold a wealth of data that can often be overlooked.  
 
One such recommended approach for data collection best practices is modelled upon the; 
‘The JAPAN Approach’. First developed in 1998 following the introduction of the Human 
rights Act by Kent Police; it is broken down in the following diagram and plays an essential 
role in guiding OSINT and situational awareness practice: 
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Justified The actions must be justifiable in the current circumstances. For example; 
can the 'need for' and 'method of acquisition' to view, collect, store, and, 
share personal or potentially sensitive information be deemed reasonable. 
Authorised Depending on the circumstances, there may be a need for the authorisation 
of specific actions or focuses of the investigation. Either the individuals 
involved should have suitable authorisation to carry out such tasks, or it has 
been cleared/designated by a manager responsible for such actions. 
Proportionate The actions and data collection of the investigation must be proportionate, it 
must be ensured that they could not be collected reasonably and efficiently 
from other means, and it is necessary to pursue them altogether. 
Auditable The chain of evidence gathered from the investigation should be auditable 
and sufficient enough to hold up in a case of law. There must be evidence 
and clear presentation of how each step of the investigation is linked and 
developed. 
Necessary The investigator must ensure that the sought after investigation results are of 
importance and are being pursued in the best practice. 
7. Emerging Challenges to OSINT Interpretation  
Despite the best efforts to define OSINT at the beginning of this paper, the term itself and its 
defining characteristics are not absolute. Indeed, regarding the three defining characteristics 
of situational awareness OSINT there are significant criticisms of their ambiguity and how 
they are actually interpreted by law enforcement (Hulnick, 2010). Leading criticisms of the 
interpretation of OSINT are primarily focused on the definition points one and three (Gibson, 
2004) (Holland, 2012), they are explored below: 
 
1) OSINT consists of data collected from 'publicly available sources',  
2) It is data to be used in an 'intelligence context',  
3) The data collection can be performed in an overt manner. 
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Regarding the first defining point, ‘publicly available sources’ used in a policing intelligence 
context also includes financial data (such as credit reports and bank details), vehicle 
registration data (such as from DVLA databases and insurance providers) as well as 
additional data supplied to law enforcement from specialists companies that deal in bulk data 
and communications information. UK based companies such as Connexus GBG (GBG, 2017) 
and Cosain 9 (Gov.uk, 2017) utilise mobile and social media data, however only sell their 
specialist services to LEAs, or on occasion to other specialists. The access to such data 
opportunities is particularly contentious as, despite branding, they are not openly available to 
members of the public. 
 
Additionally, relating to the third defining factor; the point of challenge relates to the mention 
that the data collection ‘can’ be carried out in an overt manner, but rarely does so. Indeed, 
such online aspects of OSINT require anonymity and discretion, in part due to data protection 
and policing standards, and, therefore will not be noticeable. For example, the viewing of 
social media profiles, without direct interaction and communication, will usually never notify 
the target profile they are being viewed, this is similar for the police use of specialist 
companies and services as detailed above for big data and communications information. 
 
Sound usage of OSINT situational awareness must therefore include proper situational 
awareness that reflects on such emerging criticisms as open source investigations and 
intelligence increasingly become mainstream avenues of enquiry as well as becoming more 
prominent in the public's general knowledge thanks to modern investigative journalism and 
media programs. Given the ongoing debate of security and liberty between political groups, 
members of the public and the current government, the relatively modern integration of 
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internet-based OSINT capabilities for surveillance and investigation, are potentially volatile 
topics in the post-Snowden era (Rigoglioso, 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, contemporary OSINT situational awareness is largely and increasingly dominated by 
online research and investigations. Due to the nature of these actions being somewhat 
ambiguous it is imperative that efforts are made by LEAs to balance a degree of transparency 
alongside protecting specific methods and tactics. Modern OSINT situational awareness has 
assisted LEAs with increased capacity and operational effectiveness, additionally its format 
allows for a degree of outsider support networks through outsourcing tasks to experts and 
vetted individuals. In particular, this approach has helped through emerging security concerns 
such as terrorist networking, cybercrime actors and threat financing trends. The inclusion of 
experts, analysts and security personnel into modern OSINT is an essential factor for success 
- the importance of the 'human in the loop' is critical for efficient, accountable and 
proportionate intelligence gathering. Indeed, modern tools supplied to LEAs are often of 
great value when used to cut away the noise and help focus investigations.  
All contemporary OSINT situational awareness should be captured to the highest level of 
accountability, integrity and proportionality, such as through the 'JAPAN' approach 
described, by doing so this helps safeguard modern OSINT situational awareness methods 
against some of the emerging challenges, which include potential negative fallout from 
increasing public awareness of modern surveillance operations. 
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